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Abstract  
This paper analyses the effects of large manufacturing plant closures on local employment. 
Specifically, we estimate the net employment effects of the closure of 45 large manufacturing 
plants in Spain, which relocated abroad between 2001 and 2006. We run differences-in-
differences specifications in which locations that experience a closure are matched to 
locations with similar pre-treatment employment levels and trends. The results show that 
when a plant closes, for each job directly lost in the plant closure, between 0.3 and 0.6 jobs 
are actually lost in the local economy. The adjustment is concentrated in incumbent firms in 
the industry that suffered the closure, providing indirect evidence of labor market pooling 
effects. We find no employment effects in the rest of manufacturing industries or in the 
services sectors. These findings suggest that traditional input-output analyses tend to 
overstate the net employment losses of large plant closures.   
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1. Introduction
Local and regional governments around the world provide large plants with generous subsidies, 
often in the form of tax breaks. According to the New York Times, each year US local and State 
governments spend more than $80 billion on incentives targeted to individual firms1. In Europe, 
although government aid to firms is generally forbidden by EU legislation, national and 
regional governments do subsidize large plants by exploiting certain exemptions, including 
funds used to promote research and development, environmental protection and economic 
activities in lagging regions. Subsidies are frequently offered to attract new plants. For instance, 
Tesla Motors recently decided to locate an electric-car battery ‘gigafactory’ in Nevada (partly) 
because of a $1.25 billion tax deal. However, once a plant is operational, subsidies to avoid its 
relocation (or that of some of its activities) are also common. In fact, the $8.7 billion tax break 
that Boeing was recently offered to produce a new jet in Seattle is the largest incentive received 
by an individual firm in US history. In Spain, the Seat and Ford plants in Barcelona and 
Valencia have regularly held regional governments to ‘ransom’ under the threat of relocating 
production. 
The welfare effects of subsidies targeted to individual firms are unclear (Wilson, 1999). 
Subsidies might cause inefficiencies if they shift plant locations to low productivity areas. 
However, as emphasized by Glaeser (2001) and Greenstone and Moretti (2004), subsidies can 
also be welfare enhancing. If the local labor supply curve slopes upward, inframarginal resident 
workers will gain by the presence of a large plant. In this context, subsidies can be seen as bids 
offered by different locations reflecting local welfare gains. A similar argument applies if large 
plants create significant (positive) local production externalities. Then, a subsidy will be 
efficient if it induces a plant to locate in an area in which the resulting local externality is 
especially large. 
In the policy arena, the desirability of subsidies targeted to individual firms is often 
evaluated on a cost per job basis. An argument often made in justification of such subsidies is 
that large plants create employment in local supplier firms. In fact, input-output models predict 
(large) net employment effects of big plant openings/closures. However, the opening of a large 
plant might also tighten the local labor market and, thus, reduce employment in the rest of the 
local economy. The objective of this paper is to estimate empirically the net employment 
1http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2012/12/01/us/government-incentives.html 
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effects of large manufacturing plants. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first study to 
address this empirical question directly. 
Specifically, we estimate the net local employment effects in Spain of the closure of 45 
large manufacturing plants (median layoff of 264 jobs), which relocated abroad between 2001 
and 2006. We match each municipality experiencing a closure to a small set of municipalities 
(four in the baseline analysis) that are very similar in terms of their 2000 employment levels. 
We also find that treatments and the selected controls do not differ in their pre-treatment 
employment trends, either. This lends empirical support to the hypothesis that the plant 
relocations examined here were the result of international strategies adopted by parent 
companies and did not respond to declining, area-specific employment trends. We run 
differences-in-differences specifications in which each treatment is matched to its controls by 
including case-specific fixed effects. The results show that when a plant closes, for each job 
directly lost in the plant closure, between 0.3 and 0.6 jobs are actually lost in the local economy. 
This is explained by local incumbent plant expansions in the industry that suffered the plant 
closure. We find no employment effects in the rest of manufacturing industries or in the 
services sectors. One implication of these findings is that they suggest traditional input-output 
analyses tend to overstate the net local employment losses of large plant closures. In fact, for 
our sample of closures, the input-output framework predicts that, for each job directly lost in 
the plant closure, one additional job will be lost in the local economy. Thus, in our application, 
the input-output prediction overestimates the negative employment consequences by an order 
of three. The fact that some fired workers are reemployed in local incumbent firms in the 
industry that suffered the closure provides indirect evidence of labor market pooling 
hypothesis, which states that industry concentration arises because of scale economies in the 
labor market2. Specifically, our results suggest that the presence of same industry firms allow 
workers to change employers when firm specific shocks occur3. 
Fox and Murray (2004) and Edmiston (2004) study the employment effects of large 
plant openings in the US. Both studies conclude that such openings largely fail to create indirect 
jobs in the local economy. Here, our study seeks to complement these earlier reports by 
quantifying the effects of large plant closures. Note that the effects of openings and closures 
                                                          
2 Ellison et al. (2010), Jofre-Monseny et al. (2011) and Faggio et al. (2015) test the relative importance 
of labor market pooling vis-à-vis other agglomeration economies’ mechanisms. 
3 Krugman (1991) formalizes this argument while Overman and Puga (2010) show that, in the UK, 
industries with more idiosyncratic volatility tend to be more geographically concentrated. 
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need not necessarily coincide if, for instance, a closure provides an opportunity for local 
incumbents to hire trained workers that have recently been laid off. Our study shows that plant 
closures do not, in fact, destroy indirect jobs and, moreover, that they actually generate jobs in 
local incumbent firms. As a consequence, the net employment effects of closures are smaller 
than the initial layoff itself. Greenstone et al. (2010) also study large plant openings in the US 
but focus on the impact on local productivity. In a unique empirical design, the authors use data 
on the subsidies offered to new plants by different local and State governments to define 
‘winning’ counties (those attracting a plant) and ‘losing’ counties (those left as runners-up in 
the choice process). They find that the opening of a large plant increases the productivity of 
incumbent plants in the winning county relative to that of plants in the losing county. In line 
with our study, Hooker and Knetter (2001) and Poppert and Herzog (2003) estimate the local 
employment effects of closures but focus their attention on US military bases as opposed to 
manufacturing plants. They report that net employment effects are very similar to the number 
of jobs directly destroyed by the closure. Finally, Moretti (2010) develops a framework to 
estimate empirically the local impact of creating an additional job in a tradable industry on 
employment levels in the rest of local industries4. His estimates indicate that additional jobs in 
one part of the tradable sector have a negligible impact on jobs in other parts of the tradable 
sector but a large positive effect on those in the non-tradable sector, especially if these newly 
created positions are for skilled occupations that command higher wages. Our results can 
(partly) be reconciled with those reported in Moretti (2010) as net employment effects in the 
industry directly affected by the closure are much smaller than the closure layoffs themselves. 
Following on from this introduction, the rest of the paper is organized as follows. 
Section 2 describes the data used throughout the paper with particular emphasis on individual 
plant closures. In Section 3 we explain how we select the control locations to match the areas 
experiencing a plant closure in terms of their respective pre-treatment employment levels. 
Section 4 introduces the empirical specifications used and presents the results. Finally, section 
5 concludes. 
 
 
 
                                                          
4 Using this same framework, Faggio and Overman (2014) estimate the local labor market effects of 
public sector employment. 
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2. Data 
 
Our study examines the impact of 45 large plant closures in the manufacturing sector resulting 
from international relocations. In this section we first describe the characteristics and 
circumstances of these closures. Then, we turn our attention to the employment data sources 
that constitute our outcome of interest. 
 
2.1 (International relocation) plant closures 
 
Information on plant closures (and their corresponding job losses) is obtained by combining 
various data sources. Thus, we draw on information from the firms’ international relocation 
dataset built by Myro and Fernández-Otheo (2008) and combine this with balance sheet data 
extracted from the Sistema de Análisis de Balances Ibéricos (SABI) and information obtained 
from newspapers and the trade unions. We restrict our attention to the 45 plant closures 
resulting from international relocations that occurred between 2001 and 2006 and which 
involved, at least, 100 job losses5. We exclude closures in the five largest Spanish 
municipalities (Madrid, Barcelona, Valencia, Seville and Zaragoza) as layoffs here are unlikely 
to represent a relevant shock to local employment. However, by so doing, only three closures 
are excluded. 
For each closure, we collected the following information: firm’s name, year of closure, 
number of workers laid off, activity (3-digit CNAE-93 classification), municipality of origin 
and the new country of destination6. Table A1, deferred to the Appendix, reports these plant-
level data. Most of the closures in our dataset (49%) correspond to what the OECD classifies 
as medium-technology industries. The number of workers laid off ranges between 105 and 
1,600, with a median of 264. In terms of their impact on the local economy, the layoffs 
represent, on average, 30 percent of local employment in the industry suffering the plant 
closure. In Spain, firms are among the smallest in OECD countries7. In fact, the average 
                                                          
5 Greenstone et al. (2010) examine evidence from 47 large plant openings in the US. 
6 CNAE-93 is the Spanish equivalent to the NACE classification. 
7 Entrepreneurship at a Glance 2012 (OECD). 
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manufacturing plant employs 14 workers and, therefore, all the closures in our sample can be 
considered as being big8. 
The plant closures we analyze form part of international relocation processes. As Table 
A1 shows, most plants relocated to China or Eastern Europe. Using international relocation 
closures to estimate the effect of large layoffs on the local economy is helpful in terms of 
identification to the extent that these closures can be attributed directly to the parent companies’ 
international strategy rather than the effects of declining local employment. As is shown below, 
we find no evidence that the areas experiencing closures present differential employment trends 
prior to the closure. Two other factors need to be borne in mind when interpreting the effects 
of these plant closures. First, the study period was characterized by economic growth. Between 
2000 and 2008, the Spanish economy experienced an average annual growth rate of 3.1 percent; 
however, in the manufacturing sector, growth was much less vigorous with employment rising 
at an annual rate of 0.77 percent. Second, among the countries of the OECD, Spain’s 
employment protection regulations represent some of the strictest. This holds also for collective 
dismissals9. In Spain, plant closures are accompanied by a bargaining process between the firm 
and trade unions mediated by the (regional) government. Anecdotal evidence suggests that 
deals generally involve severance payments above the (already very high) statutory level, early 
retirement packages and attempts by local and regional governments to re-locate workers 
within the local economy. 
 
2.2 Employment outcomes 
 
The outcome we examine is local employment at the industry level. We draw primarily on 
Social Security employment counts by industry and municipality. The data covers the universe 
of employees in Spanish municipalities at the 2-digit industry level. One caveat of this dataset 
is that it does not cover self-employed workers10. We follow employment outcomes in the 
period 2000 to 2008. Since we will study the impact of plant closures taking place between 
2001 and 2006, this gives us a minimum of one pre-treatment year (2000) and two post-
treatment years (2007 and 2008). Additionally, we use employment data from the 1990 Census 
                                                          
8 Spanish Social Security for the year 2000. 
9 OECD Employment Outcome 2004. 
10 The data, in fact, exclude all workers in specific social security regimes which, in addition to the self-
employed, include agricultural workers, and civil servants. 
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of Establishments, which enables us to measure (and control for) local (pre-treatment) 
employment trends. We end the period of analysis in 2008 for two reasons. First, in 2009 the 
industry classification underwent a major overhaul and, second, 2008 was the last year of 
economic growth in Spain with output growing at 0.9 percent11,12. 
 
 
3. Matching procedure 
 
Most of the 8,122 municipalities in Spain are quite small, which suggests the impact of a plant 
closure might extend beyond a municipality’s borders. Therefore, we construct a 10-km ring 
around each municipality in order to capture a municipality’s immediate neighbors. This ring 
is built by calculating air distances between municipality centroids and the resulting area serves 
as our baseline geographical unit. We define a treated area as one suffering a plant closure 
between 2001 and 2006 and we select four appropriate controls using a matching procedure 
based on employment characteristics measured in 2000. Each treatment and its corresponding 
controls constitute what we label here as a case. Figure 1 illustrates the case of La Cellophane 
Española, a rubber and plastics plant in Burgos that closed in 2001. Panel (a) shows the 
geographical location of treatment and controls (Llinars del Vallès, Logroño, Alcalá de 
Henares and Silla). Panel (b) zooms in to show that the five areas are in fact the sum of the 
municipality itself (dark gray) and its neighbors lying within a 10-km ring (light gray). 
 
[Figure 1 here] 
 
The matching procedure applied operates in two steps13. First, for each municipality in 
Spain, we compute its total level of employment in 2000 by adding to its own employment 
                                                          
11 From 2009, the industry classification adopted was CNAE-2009. 
12 In 2009 there was a sharp drop in output of 3.8 percent (EUROSTAT). 
13 We do not use propensity score matching because our sample only contains plants that eventually 
closed due to an international relocation strategy. As such, we cannot predict where these plant closures 
might occur. An alternative matching procedure, and one that is more similar to the one used here, is 
the synthetic control algorithm, which matches pre-treatment trends in the dependent variable (see 
Abadie and Gardeazabal, 2003). However, this method is more appropriate for cases in which the 
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level that of its neighbors. Then, we rank the 8,122 Spanish municipalities and create six 
categories (<5, 5-10, 10-20, 20-50, 50-100 and >100 thousand employees). We restrict the 
matching procedure to municipalities within the same total employment category. Thus in the 
case illustrated in Figure 1, Burgos, Llinars del Vallès, Logroño, Alcalá de Henares and Silla 
have an employment level of between 50 and 100 thousand jobs, if we consider number of jobs 
in the municipality itself (dark gray) together with the number of jobs in the neighboring 
municipalities (light gray). In the second step, the target is to make treated and control areas 
similar in terms of employment levels in 2000 in the specific industry affected by the closure. 
To do so, we compute the distance for this industry between the level of employment in each 
potential control and each treated area. This is done in two dimensions: first, we only consider 
employment at the level of the municipality and, second, we add to this figure the jobs in the 
neighboring municipalities. Then, we compute the following Euclidean distance √(Im)2+(Ia)2, 
where Im and Ia are the employment deviations in the industry affected by the plant closure at 
the municipality and area (municipality and neighbors) levels, respectively. Among the control 
municipalities whose employment level in this industry is higher than that of the treated 
municipality, i.e. Im >0, we select the two controls with the smallest Euclidean distance. We 
apply the same procedure to the control municipalities whose employment level in the affected 
industry is lower, i.e. Im <0. In the case illustrated in Figure 1, Llinars del Vallès and Silla are 
the two closest matches having higher levels of employment than Burgos in the rubber and 
plastics industry in 2000. Analogously, Logroño and Alcalá de Henares are the two closest 
matches with lower levels of employment in this industry. While we allow municipalities to be 
the controls for more than one treatment, we do not always find four controls for all cases. As 
a result, we have 217 (as opposed to 225) case-municipality observations. 
In order to validate this matching procedure, we regress predetermined employment 
variables on a treatment indicator variable, while controlling for case fixed-effects. The results 
are reported in Table 1. 
[Table 1 here] 
                                                          
treatment affects a large aggregate, such as a region or a country. In our case, we are able to choose our 
counterfactuals from a pool of more than 8,000 municipalities and so building a synthetic control is 
unnecessary.  
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The dependent variables in columns 2, 4 and 6 are the employment outcomes for the 
year 2000 that are directly used in the matching procedure. These results validate the matching 
insofar as the treated and control areas do not present statistically significant differences for 
any of the variables used to perform the matching. In columns 1, 3 and 5 we measure the same 
employment outcomes in 1990, namely, the level of employment in the affected industry at the 
municipality and area levels, and total employment at the area level14. The results indicate that 
employment levels in 1990 in treatments and controls were also similar, suggesting common 
pre-treatment employment trends. Figure 2 illustrates this point by plotting the evolution in 
employment in the industry suffering a plant closure for the treatment and control groups, 
where both time and employment levels have been normalized for the year of plant closure. 
 
[Figure 2 here] 
 
 
4. Results 
Using this matched sample, we use differences-in-differences specifications to estimate the 
effects of big plant closures on local employment. We focus our attention primarily on the 
employment changes that occurred between 2000 and 2008. 
 
4.1. Local employment effects in the industry affected by the plant closure 
 
In this section we seek to estimate the impact of a plant closure on the employment in the 
industry suffering that closure. We estimate variants of the following equation: 
 ∆employment
ij
=αc+β job lossesij +Xij
' δ + uij                                       (1) 
where ∆employment
ij
 is the job change in area i and industry j between 2000 and 2008 and, 
thus, uij denotes shocks in employment changes. The key explanatory variable is job losses, 
                                                          
14 The 1990 employment outcomes are drawn from Censo de Locales del INE 1990. 
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which is defined as the layoff count associated with the particular plant closure. If |β| equals 1, 
then each job lost as a result of the closure translates simply as one job lost in the local industry 
affected by that closure. We label |β|equal to unity as ‘the mechanical effect’, as this is the 
expected outcome if the closure had zero impact on the rest of the firms in the affected industry. 
However, if |β|> 1, then each job lost as a result of the closure generates additional job losses 
in the affected industry and area. A possible mechanism accounting for such an outcome is the 
one often used to justify subsidies, namely, that large plants create indirect jobs through the 
purchase of inputs from local suppliers15. Alternatively, if |β|< 1, then each job lost as a result 
of the closure creates jobs in the local industry affected by the closure. In the presence of 
workers that are imperfectly mobile across locations and industries, a significant collective 
dismissal would reduce labor market tightness and increase employment in all other local firms. 
In terms of control variables, case fixed-effects (αc) are included to account for case industry 
employment trends while, in some specifications, the 1990 and 2000 (pre-treatment) 
employment outcomes used in the matching procedure are further included (Xij
' ) as controls. 
The baseline results are reported in the first two columns of Table 2. 
 
[Table 2 here] 
 
The first column shows the estimates of a specification that only includes case fixed-
effects. The results imply that a job lost as a result of a large plant closure reduces employment 
in the affected industry and area by -0.521, implying that the closure spurs employment growth 
in local firms operating in the same industry and area as the closing plant. In the second column, 
we add the pre-treatment employment levels (Xij
' ) to the case fixed-effects. Specifically, we 
include the 2000 and 1990 industry and overall employment levels. As expected, the main 
estimate of interest, β, is not greatly affected by the inclusion of these pre-treatment outcomes 
(the point estimate is -0.628) as these controls are orthogonal to treatment status as shown in 
Table 1. In the third column of Table 2, we estimate a slightly different model by pooling all 
manufacturing industries so as to account for (possible) area specific trends in employment. 
Here, the specifications include case industry fixed-effects and area fixed-effects. The results 
                                                          
15 The presence of agglomeration economies would also be consistent with |β|> 1 as the productivity of 
local firms (and labor demand) would depend positively on local employment size. 
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yield a point estimate of -0.556, confirming that when a large plant closes, employment in the 
rest of the firms within the local area and sector increases rather than decreases. This finding 
provides indirect evidence of labor market pooling effects. As first put forward by Marshall 
(1890), industry concentration creates scale economies by allowing workers to move between 
firms when idiosyncratic shocks at the firm level occur. 
As discussed above, input-output analyses have often been used to predict the net 
employment effects of large plant openings/closures. For our sample of plant closures, a 
traditional input-output analysis predicts that for each job directly lost in the closure, another 
(indirect) job is lost in the local economy16. As such, our results seem to suggest that input-
output analysis performs very poorly in predicting local employment responses to plant 
closures. Specifically, the traditional input-output analysis predicts a reduction in net 
employment that is three times greater (in absolute terms) than that observed.  
We check the robustness of our results to the specific matching procedure adopted in 
two ways. First, we re-run the baseline specification selecting only the two closest controls (as 
opposed to four). The results, reported in columns 1 to 3 in Table A2 (deferred to the 
Appendix), are largely unchanged, suggesting that our findings do not hinge on the exact 
number of controls selected. Second, we run a placebo exercise in which we drop the actual 
treatment and randomly assign it to any of the four controls. The results, presented in columns 
4 to 6, are reassuring as none of the coefficients of interest are statistically significant. 
In the baseline regressions (panel A in Table 2), we focus on changes in employment 
in an eight-year time window. We do this as opposed to examining yearly changes for two 
reasons. First, (potential) anticipation effects might mean that employment falls in the year(s) 
prior to a plant closure. Second, the local response to a plant closure might take more than one 
year to take effect. To determine whether these possibilities are relevant in our application, in 
panel B of Table 2 we examine yearly employment changes between 2000 and 2008. In these 
regressions, we include the main explanatory variable (job losses) in the year the closure occurs 
as well as three lags and leads of this variable. In terms of control variables, Panels A and B 
adhere to the same logic, although the addition of the time dimension changes the nature of the 
fixed-effects that can be accounted for. Specifically, column 4 only includes case year fixed-
effects while column 5 includes both these and the pre-treatment employment controls, namely, 
                                                          
16 This is the average effect across the 45 closures using the 2005 Catalan Input–Output Table built by 
Statistics Catalonia (IDESCAT) 
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the 2000 and 1990 industry and overall employment levels. In column 6, we pool all 
manufacturing industries and, in addition to the pre-treatment employment controls, we 
introduce case industry year fixed-effects and area fixed-effects. We find no statistically 
significant results for any of the lag and lead variables. This finding suggests that anticipation 
effects are not especially relevant in our application and that the bulk of the adjustment takes 
place within a year of plant closure. These results are largely consistent with Figure 2 in which 
we show the evolution in the level of employment in the treated and control groups. However, 
the contemporaneous closure point estimates are slightly higher (in absolute value) than those 
found using 2000-2008 differences. Specifically, the point estimates using yearly variation 
range between -0.687 and -0.728. This is consistent with a slight recovery in employment levels 
in the treated areas in the years after the plant closure. 
In section 3, when describing the matching procedure used, it was acknowledged that 
the effects of a plant closure might extend beyond the borders of a municipality. In Table 3 we 
explore in depth the geographical scope of the effects under study. To this end, we estimate 
variants of the following specification: 
 ∆employment
mj
=αc+β0 job lossesmj I0 +β10 job lossesijI10 + γI0+Xmj
' δ + umj             (2) 
where  ∆employment
mj
 is the 2000-2008 change in the number of jobs in municipality m and 
industry j. Note that there are four types of municipality. Returning to the example illustrated 
in Figure 1, there is one treated area (Burgos) and four control areas (Llinars del Vallès, 
Logroño, Alcalá de Henares and Silla). In turn, each area comprises the municipality itself 
(dark gray) and the municipalities within a 10-km radius of it (light gray). Hence, we have 
treated municipalities, treated neighbors, untreated municipalities and untreated neighbors. I0 
indicates if the municipality itself is a treatment or a control (dark gray municipality) while I10 
takes the value of one for the remaining municipalities within the treated and control areas 
(light gray municipalities). In the regressions we interact these indicators with our main 
explanatory variable and, thus, we estimate the employment effect in the municipality directly 
affected by the closure (β
0
) and in the municipalities within a 10-km radius of the plant that 
has been closed down (β
10
). Since the number of jobs in the plant being closed down does not 
form part of the neighbors’ employment figures, no effects being recorded in neighboring 
municipalities implies β
10
= 0. The results are presented in Table 3.  
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[Table 3 here] 
 
Here again column 1 only includes case fixed-effects and the indicator variable I0. 
Column 2 additionally includes, as controls, 1990 and 2000 (pre-treatment) employment levels 
measured here at the municipality level. Finally, column 3 pools the data from all 
manufacturing industries. We find no evidence that the effects of a big plant closure extend 
beyond the municipality in which the closure has occurred. Hence, our finding that plant 
closures spur employment growth in local firms operating in the same industry and area is 
driven solely by the behavior of firms located in the same municipality as that which has 
suffered the plant closure17. 
 
4.2 Effects on other manufacturing industries and services 
 
According to input-output predictions, a plant closure has a negative impact on the employment 
in other industries. To determine whether this prediction is supported by the data, in columns 
1 and 2 of Table 4 we evaluate the effects of plant closures on employment in manufacturing 
industries (excluding for each case, the industry directly affected by the closure). Analogously, 
we test in columns 3 and 4 whether the layoffs caused by the plant closure reduce employment 
in the services sector. The results are reported in Table 4. 
 
[Table 4 here] 
 
Table 4 reports the outcomes of specifications in which the 2000-2008 employment 
change at the (2-digit) industry level is regressed on the job losses attributable directly to the 
closure and case industry fixed-effects. In columns 2 and 4 we also include pre-treatment 
employment controls. All the coefficients in Table 4 are statistically insignificant and close to 
zero, suggesting that plant closures have no effect on employment levels outside the industry 
                                                          
17 Additional evidence that interactions between firms are highly localized has been provided by 
Rosenthal and Strange (2003) and Arzaghi and Henderson (2008) for the US and by Viladecans-Marsal 
(2004) and Jofre-Monseny (2009) for the Spanish case. 
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directly affected by the closure. Since one job directly lost in the closure reduces employment 
in that industry by less than one job, it is important to keep in mind that the regressions reported 
in Table 4 measure the impact of net job reductions in the affected industry. This goes some 
way to reconciling our results with those reported by Moretti (2010), which suggest that 
reductions in tradable jobs reduce employment in the non-tradable industries. 
 
4.3 The effects of plant closures on incumbents and new entrants 
 
The results reported in section 4.1 indicate that for each job lost due to a plant closure only 
around 0.6 jobs are lost in the affected industry. This suggests that jobs are created in the 
industry and area directly affected by the closure. In this regard, it is interesting to determine 
whether these jobs are created by incumbent or new firms. To answer this question we draw 
on data from the SABI (firm-level) database. Although SABI does not cover the universe of 
Spanish firms, its coverage is extensive (around 80 percent of the firms on the Social Security 
register) and it does include the self-employed18. We identify in the SABI database all firms 
reported as being active in the industry affected by the plant closure. This means the industry 
definition applied here is somewhat wider than that used above as a firm might be active in 
more than one industry. Columns 1 to 3 in Table 5 re-estimate the baseline analysis using local 
employment levels built with the SABI database. We exclude the jobs in the plant closed down 
and, thus, the ‘mechanical effect’ now becomes zero. 
 
[Table 5 here] 
 
 The results indicate that for each job lost due to a plant closure, between 0.5 and 0.6 
jobs are created in the local industry affected by the closure. These point estimates are slightly 
higher than those recorded in Table 3, which lie between 0.3 and 0.5. This result is, however, 
consistent with the broader industry definition used in the SABI database and the fact that SABI 
also includes the self-employed. Importantly, the results obtained with this alternative dataset 
                                                          
18 SABI is a firm and not a plant database. Nevertheless, the Spanish economy is dominated by small 
and medium sized firms. In fact, only 1.1 percent of the firms in Spain in 2006 were multi-plant firms 
(Encuesta sobre Estrategias Empresariales, 2008). 
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confirm our main qualitative results, namely, that the net employment effects of large plant 
closures are not as high as the direct job losses associated with the closure itself. In columns 4 
to 9 in Table 5 we re-run the analysis, breaking down the changes in levels of employment 
between incumbent firms (columns 4 to 6) and new entrants (columns 7 to 9). According to the 
results, the impact on jobs is concentrated in the incumbents, that is, in firms that existed before 
the plant was closed down. 
 
 
5. Conclusions 
 
Local and regional governments around the world use subsidies to attract large plants. 
Similarly, large incumbent plants will often try to hold regional governments to ‘ransom’ under 
the threat of relocating production. The argument frequently made to justify such subsidies is 
that large plant closures have marked effects on employment that can extend beyond those of 
the collective dismissal itself. Indeed, the input-output framework has been used in predicting 
very large net employment losses. In this paper, we have empirically estimated the ‘real’ net 
local employment responses to large manufacturing plant closures. 
 Specifically, we have estimated the employment effects of the closure of 45 large 
manufacturing plants in Spain, which relocated to low-wage countries between 2001 and 2006. 
We match each municipality experiencing a closure to a small set of comparable municipalities 
in terms of employment level and mix in the year 2000. We find that treatments and controls 
do not differ in their 1990-2000 (pre-treatment) employment trends, thereby lending credence 
to the identification assumption underpinning our differences-in-differences estimates. Our 
results show that when a plant closes, for each job directly lost in the plant closure, only 
between 0.3 and 0.6 jobs are actually lost in the local economy, with the adjustment being 
concentrated in local incumbent firms in the industry having suffered the closure. One 
implication of these findings is that they suggest traditional input-output analyses tend to 
overstate the net employment losses of large plant closures. In our application, the input-output 
prediction overestimates the negative employment consequences by an order of three. 
 A couple of considerations are worth making regarding the external validity of our 
findings. First, among the countries of the OECD, Spain’s employment protection regulations 
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are among the strictest. At the same time, following a big plant closure, Spain’s regional 
governments often intervene to facilitate the re-employment of some of the dismissed workers 
in local firms. Hence, employment responses may differ in contexts with less government 
intervention. Second, the closures we analyze occurred in a period (2001-2006) in which the 
Spanish economy was growing. It could well be that the consequences of massive layoffs are 
far more negative in stagnant economies. This said, our findings suggest that, in normal times, 
local employment responses do not seem to justify the payment of large subsidies to avoid the 
relocation of large manufacturing plants. 
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Table 1. Differences between treatments and controls. Pre-treatment employment 
levels in 1990 and 2000 
  Employment in the affected industry  Overall employment  
 1990 2000 1990 2000 1990 2000 
  
Municipality 
Area (Municipality 
& neighbors) 
Area (Municipality & 
neighbors) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Treatments 
-60.03 -70.07 -40.55 -67.43 14,704 19,541 
(308.7) (264.9) (338.4) (276.1) (20,118) (28,205) 
Case dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R-squared 0.799 0.795 0.877 0.881 0.682 0.684 
Observations 217 217 217 217 217 217 
Robust standard errors in parentheses (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1) 
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Table 2. Impact of a plant closure on the affected industry. 
 A: 2000-2008 long differences B: 2000-2008 yearly differences 
 
Industry affected by 
plant closure  
Pooled 
industries 
Industry affected by 
plant closure  
Pooled 
industries 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Job losses 
-0.521** -0.628*** -0.556**    
(0.228) (0.231) (0.227)    
       
Job losses (-3) 
    0.001 0.029 0.070 
    (0.132) (0.117) (0.069) 
Job losses (-2) 
    -0.025 0.000 -0.017 
    (0.096) (0.096) (0.097) 
Job losses (-1) 
    -0.021 0.002 -0.036 
    (0.071) (0.068) (0.053) 
Job losses (0) 
   -0.700*** -0.687*** -0.728*** 
   (0.168) (0.178) (0.133) 
Job losses (+1) 
    0.046 0.059 0.072 
    (0.095) (0.09) (0.049) 
Job losses (+2) 
    -0.061 -0.061 -0.087 
    (0.103) (0.103) (0.118) 
Job losses (+3) 
    -0.087 -0.088 -0.039 
    (0.064) (0.065) (0.064) 
Case fixed-effects Yes Yes No No No No 
Pre-treatment 
employment 
controls 
No Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
Case year fixed-
effects 
No No No Yes Yes No 
Case industry 
fixed-effects 
No No Yes No No No 
Case industry 
year fixed-effects 
No No No No No Yes 
Area fixed-effects No No Yes No No Yes 
R-squared 0.649 0.797 0.799 0.189 0.194 0.165 
Observations 217 217 4,991 1,720 1,720 39,792 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1). The dependent 
variable in columns 1 to 3 is the change in employment between 2000 and 2008 at the 2-digit 
industry level. The dependent variable in columns 4 to 6 are 2000-2008 yearly changes. Columns 
1, 2, 4 and 5 include only the treated industry for each case while columns 3 and 6 include all 
manufacturing industries. Pre-treatment employment controls are the 2000 and 1990 levels at the 
appropriate industry level as well as in total employment. There are 23 (2-digit) industries in 
columns 3 and 6. 
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Table 3. The geographical scope of the employment effects of a big plant closure. 
2000-2008 long differences.  
 Industry affected by plant 
closure  
Pooled 
industries  
  (1) (2) (3) 
Job losses in own municipality (β0) 
-0.800*** -0.515*** -0.634*** 
(0.14) (0.122) (0.121) 
Job losses in neighboring municipality (β10) 
0.023 -0.018 -0.01 
(0.024) (0.021) (0.021) 
Case fixed-effects Yes Yes No 
I0 indicator Yes Yes Yes 
Pre-treatment employment controls No Yes Yes 
Case industry fixed-effects No No Yes 
Area fixed-effects No No Yes 
R-squared 0.14 0.454 0.491 
Observations  2,514 2,514 57,822 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1). The 
dependent variable is the change in employment between 2000 and 2008 at the industry 
and municipality level. I0 as defined in the text. Columns 1 and 2 include only the treated 
industry for each case, while column 3 includes all manufacturing industries in each 
municipality. Pre-treatment employment controls are the 2000 and 1990 levels at the 
appropriate industry level as well as in total employment at the municipality level. There 
are 23 (2-digit) industries in columns 3. 
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Table 4. Impact of a plant closure on other industries 2000-2008  
  
Other manufacturing 
industries Services 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Job losses 
0.111 -0.003 0.000 0.001 
(0.089) (0.008) (0.000) (0.003) 
Case industry fixed-
effects 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Pre-treatment 
employment controls 
No Yes No Yes 
R-squared 0.498 0.787 0.626 0.806 
Observations  4,774 4,774 3,255 3,255 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1). The 
dependent variable is the change in employment between 2000 and 2008 at the industry and 
area level. Pre-treatment employment controls are the 2000 and 1990 levels at the 
appropriate industry level as well as in total employment. There are 23 (2-digit) industries 
in columns 1 and 2 and 15 in columns 3 and 4. 
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Table 5. Impact of a plant closure on the affected industry. SABI database. 2000-2008 changes. 
  Overall New firms Incumbent firms 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Job losses 
0.519** 0.511** 0.618** 0.013 0.009 0.022 0.533** 0.520** 0.595** 
(0.243) (0.239) (0.247) (0.038) (0.038) (0.05) (0.243) (0.237) (0.242) 
Case fixed-effects Yes Yes No No No No No No No 
Pre-treatment 
employment 
controls 
No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
Case industry     
fixed-effects 
No No Yes No No No No No No 
Area fixed-effects No No Yes No No Yes No No Yes 
R-squared 0.318 0.341 0.367 0.597 0.627 0.507 0.311 0.327 0.354 
Observations  217 217 4,991 217 217 4,991 217 217 4,991 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1). The dependent variable is the change 
in employment between 2000 and 2008 at the 2-digit industry level computed using the SABI database and 
excluding the plant forced to close. Columns 1, 2, 4, 5, 7 and 8 include only the treated industry for each case while 
columns 3, 6 and 9 include all manufacturing industries. Pre-treatment employment controls are the 2000 and 1990 
levels at the appropriate industry level as well as in total employment. There are 23 (2-digit) industries in columns 
3, 6 and 9. 
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Appendix 
Table A1. Big Plant Closures Sample 
Case Firm Municipality 2-digit Industry Classification Year  Nº of Job losses Destination 
1 Jumberca S.A. Badalona 29 - Machinery and equipment 2002 201 China 
2 Proflex S.A. Calaf 24 - Chemicals and chemical products 2004 105 Czech Republic 
3 Torcidos Ibéricos S.A. Castellbell i el Vilar 17 - Textiles 2005 116 India 
4 Braun Española S.L. Esplugues de Llobregat 29 - Machinery and equipment 2006 684 China 
5 DB Apparel Spain S.A. Igualada 17 - Textiles 2003 255 Morocco 
6 Tenería Moderna S.A.L. Mollet del Vallès 19 - Leather and leather Products 2003 131  -- 
7 Hilados y Tejidos Puigneró S.A. Sant Bartomeu del Grau 17 - Textiles 2002 502  -- 
8 Galler Textiles S.A. Sant Boi de Llobregat 17 - Textiles 2003 313 Thailand 
9 ZF Sistemas de dirección Nacam S.L. Sant Boi de Llobregat 34 - Motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers 2006 185 Germany/France 
10 José Ribatallada S.L. Cerdanyola del Vallès  15 - Food products and beverages 2005 117  --  
11 Celestica S.L. Cerdanyola del Vallès  30 - Office machinery and computers 2004 320 Czech Republic 
12 Selecciones Americanas S.A. Sitges 18 - Wearing apparel, dressing and dyeing of fur 2005 124 China 
13 IMC Toys S.A. Terrassa 36 - Furniture and other manufacturing 2003 139 China 
14 Autotex S.A. Viladecavalls 17 - Textiles 2004 189 Czech Republic 
15 TRW Automotive España S.L. Burgos 34 - Motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers 2005 318 Poland/Czech Republic 
16 La Cellophane Española S.A. Burgos 25 - Rubber and plastics products 2001 310  -- 
17 Delphi Automotive Systems España S.L. Puerto Real 34 - Motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers 2006 1,600 Morocco 
18 Panasonic Iberia S.A. Celrà 29 - Machinery and equipment 2004 214 China 
19 Tybor S.A. Massanes 17 - Textiles 2003 149 China 
20 La Preparación Textil S.A. Ripoll 17 - Textiles 2004 145 China 
21 Promek S.L. Azuqueca de Henares 34 - Motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers 2004 350 Poland/Czech Republic 
22 Moulinex España, S.A. Barbastro 29 - Machinery and equipment 2003 270 China 
23 JoyCo España S.A. Alcarràs 15 - Food products and beverages 2004 213 China 
24 Lear Corporation Spain S.L. Cervera 31 - Electrical machinery and apparatus 2001 1,280 Poland 
25 Delphi Componentes S.A. Agoncillo 34 - Motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers 2001 578 Poland 
26 Electrolux España S.A. Fuenmayor 29 - Machinery and equipment 2005 454 Hungary 
27 Yoplait España S.L. Alcobendas 15 - Food products and beverages 2001 185 France 
28 Sanmina-SCI España S.L. Leganés 32 - Radio, television and communication equipment  2001 250 Hungary 
29 Vitelcom Mobile Technology S.A. Málaga 32 - Radio, television and communication equipment  2004 433 Korea 
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30 Calseg S.A. Artajona 19 - Leather and leather Products 2001 150 Tunisia 
31 Findus España S.L. Marcilla 15 - Food products and beverages 2001 471 Italy/UK 
32 Viscofan S.A. Pamplona 25 - Rubber and plastics products 2006 742 Brazil/Czech Republic 
33 TRW Automotive España S.A. Orkoien 34 - Motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers 2002 382 Poland 
34 Valeo Sistemas de Conexión Eléctrica S.L. San Cibrao das Viñas 31 - Electrical machinery and apparatus 2004 264 Poland 
35 MMN&P Acconta S.A. Segovia 34 - Motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers 2001 190 Morocco 
36 Levi Strauss de España S.A. Ólvega 17 - Textiles 2003 561 Poland/Hungary 
37 Delphi Packard España S.L. Ólvega 34 - Motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers 2001 560 Morocco/Romania 
38 GDX Automotive Ibérica S.L. Valls 25 - Rubber and plastics products 2005 153 Germany/Czech Republic 
39 Sanmina-SCI España S.L. Toledo 32 - Radio, television and communication equipment  2005 430 Thailand/China 
40 Alcatel Lucent España S.A. Toledo 32 - Radio, television and communication equipment  2002 150 Hungary 
41 Grupo Tavex S.A. Alginet 17 - Textiles 2006 300 Brazil/Mexico 
42 Bayer Cropscience S.A. Quart de Poblet 24 - Chemicals and chemical products 2006 300 Portugal 
43 Valeo España S.A. Abrera 31 - Electrical machinery and apparatus 2001 406 Morocco/Tunisia 
44 IAR Ibérica S.A. Montcada i Reixac 29 - Machinery and equipment 2004 423 Hungary 
45 Fisipe Barcelona S.A. El Prat de Llobregat 17 - Textiles 2006 270 China 
Notes: (1) Source: Authors’ own elaboration. 
(2) In cases 6,7,10 and 16 we have been unable to identify the country to which the firm relocated.  
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Table A2. Impact of a plant closure in the affected industry. 2000-2008 employment 
changes. Robustness checks. 
 
Industry affected by 
plant closure  
Pooled 
industries 
Industry affected 
by plant closure  
Pooled 
industries 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Job losses 
-0.597** -0.771*** -0.645** 0.227 0.074 0.040 
(0.288) (0.276) (0.269) 
(0.21
4) 
(0.251) (0.232) 
Case fixed-effects Yes Yes No No No No 
Pre-treatment 
employment 
controls 
No Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
Case industry    
fixed-effects 
No No Yes No No No 
Area fixed-effects No No Yes No No Yes 
R-squared 0.596 0.787 0.822 0.626 0.841 0.832 
Observations 131 131 3,013 172 172 3,956 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1). The dependent 
variable is the change in employment between 2000 and 2008 at the 2-digit industry level. 
Columns 1, 2, 4 and 5 include only the treated industry for each case while columns 3 and 6 
include all manufacturing industries. Pre-treatment employment controls are all the outcomes 
examined in Table 1. 
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